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Abstract 
Latterly, various experts and political analysts have been hotly debating in the world press whether the West should strike Iran in order to 
stop its nuclear program. The first part of the article deals with argumentation whether to strike Iran in order to stop its nuclear program 
and simultaneously presents variant viewpoints on what specific threat nuclear-armed Iran poses. The second half of the article discusses 
a possible course of action the United States might take to curb Iran and consequential events. The article aims to arrive at a less destruc-
tive solution to the problem.
The article directs to the conclusion that Iran’s aggressive foreign policy bears defensive nature driven by the self-survival instinct of an 
isolated country. The nuclear program also serves this very purpose to provide more security guarantees for the regime, minimize the 
risk of external strike and increase its bargaining power during the negotiations. Currently, the regional spoiler role is the only one to be 
played by Iran, enabling this developing and unformed economy country to resemble a great power player. Thus, if the United States does 
wish to neutralize nuclear-armed Iran and consequential threats, it should stop to isolate the latter from regional politics and let it become 
one of the building blocks of regional political security architecture, as this could assure Iran in the possibility of maintaining its security 
without going nuclear.
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Introduction
Latterly, various experts and political analysts have been 
hotly debating in the world press whether the West should 
strike Iran in order to stop its nuclear program. This issue 
was discussed with particular intensity in the top-ranking 
analytical magazine “Foreign Affairs” where Mathew 
Kroenig’s article “Time to Attack Iran” was responded by 
Colin H. Kahl with his article “Not Time to Attack Iran”, 
whereas Kenneth N. Waltz’s article “Why Iran Should Get 
the Bomb” was followed by Colin H. Kahl’s article “Iran 
and the Bomb; Would a Nuclear Iran Make the Middle East 
More Secure?”, etc. 
The first part of the article deals with argumentation 
whether to strike Iran in order to stop its nuclear program 
and simultaneously presents variant viewpoints on what 
specific threat nuclear-armed Iran poses. The second half 
of the article discusses a possible course of action the Unit-
ed States might take to curb Iran and consequential events. 
The article aims to arrive at a less destructive solution to 
the problem. 
Debates – to Strike or not to Strike?!
No matter which side of the argument about the strike 
is favored, several fundamental questions are likely to arise 
having a considerable bearing on the debaters to keep ar-
guing the right point. Among these fundamental issues are 
the rationality of Iranian political establishment and ideas 
about a possible range of actions nuclear-armed Iran might 
take. The article also discusses the effectiveness of mili-
tary involvement whether to permanently keep Iran away 
from atomic arsenal or just to hold it awhile. Lastly, will 
the military involvement supposed to grow into a full-scale 
war be a less disastrous event or nuclear Iran?
The supporters of hitting Iran consider Iranian leaders 
to be irrational and unpredictable, and find it impossible to 
say how this country will react if had a nuclear bomb. In 
this regard, Mathew Kroenig highlights a few basic dan-
gers in his article “Time to Attack Iran” published in “For-
eign Affairs” in February 2012: With atomic power behind 
it, Iran could threaten any U.S. political or military initia-
tive in the Middle East with nuclear war, forcing Washing-
ton to think twice before acting in the region. Also, Iran’s 
regional rivals would possibly attempt to make their own 
nuclear arsenal that is bound to cause a nuclear arms race 
in this hot spot of the world. Kroenig also takes the idea 
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that Iran could choose to spur proliferation by transferring 
nuclear technology to its allies - other countries and terror-
ist groups alike. Having the bomb would give Iran greater 
cover for conventional aggression and coercive diplomacy, 
and the battles between its terrorist proxies and Israel, for 
example, could escalate (Kroening, 2012). 
Kroenig along with other assault supporters think that 
the United States would run into large costs for a long pe-
riod of time spanning even several decades: “To keep the 
Iranian threat at bay, the United States would need to de-
ploy naval and ground units and potentially nuclear weap-
ons across the Middle East, keeping a large force in the 
area for decades to come. … It would also need to devote 
perhaps billions of dollars to improving its allies’ capabil-
ity to defend themselves. Most of all, to make containment 
credible, the United States would need to extend its nu-
clear umbrella to its partners in the region. In other words, 
to contain a nuclear Iran, the United States would need to 
make a substantial investment of political and military cap-
ital to the Middle East in the midst of an economic crisis” 
(Kroening, 2012). 
It must also be realized that some Middle East coun-
tries now considered to be US allies might possibly get 
closer to Iran due to the threats to their security. Moreover, 
they may think that if US failed to prevent Iran from be-
coming nuclear, it may also fail to protect them and keep 
peace in the region. 
Kroenig finally comes to the solution according which 
if a right action is taken a full-scale war could be avoided: 
Strike must be exercised on directly Iran’s nuclear program 
and a sharp message must be sent to the Iranian political 
leaders that the assault must not be taken as an action for 
removing them from power leading them not to face a self-
survival and make more rational and moderate responses. 
Furthermore, The United states should establish specific 
red lines after which a war would be inevitable jeopard-
izing the Iranian regime. Blocking the Strait of Hormuz, 
striking Israel and any US regional allies or destroying US 
military units in the Middle East would be taken as cross-
ing those red lines by Iran. 
The Opponents of striking Iran do not usually find the 
Iranian ruling regime irrational and think that Iran is moti-
vated to have nuclear arms for security reasons and believe 
that the atomic bomb is not end but just means for increased 
security thus making Iran rational and predictable. Faction 
still takes place whether to be possible either to convince or 
make Iran abandon its nuclear program. Some researchers 
believe that through harsh sanctions and international pres-
sure together with effective diplomacy, Iran could be made 
to take a right choice between consequent scenarios. Other 
researchers think that Iran will not abandon its nuclear pro-
gram for two reasons: On the one hand the ruling regime 
has successfully managed to speculate with this program 
on national pride and on the other hand increasing inter-
national pressure would push it to get nuclear as soon as 
possible to remain secure from the opposing powers. 
Kroenig’s article was soon caught on by the opponents 
of attacking Iran. Colin H. Kahl’s article „Not Time to At-
tack“ and Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro’s article 
„The Flawed Logic of Striking Iran“ are noteworthy in this 
respect who criticize Kroenig for believing that Iran would 
not respond to a strike with its “worst forms of retaliation, 
such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or launching missiles 
at southern Europe” unless its leaders felt that the regime’s 
“very existence was threatened.” (Kroening, 2012). They 
maintain that through establishing the red lines by US, a 
full-scale war would be avoided. They find Kroenig’s argu-
ments controversial since ironically, Kroenig believes that 
a nuclear-armed Iran would be deeply irrational and  prone 
to miscalculation yet somehow maintains that under the 
same leaders, Iran would make clear-eyed decisions in the 
immediate aftermath of a U.S. strike and do not further ag-
gravate the conflict. It is also doubtful that Iranian regime 
will not take the strike on nuclear objects as a direct threat 
to themselves as Iranian leaders have staked their domes-
tic legitimacy on resisting international pressure to halt 
the nuclear program, and so they would inevitably view 
an attack on that program as an attack on the regime itself. 
(Kahl, Not Time to Attack, 2012). 
The opponents of military confrontation with Iran see 
a particular threat in such a full-scale conflict that would 
draw other regional countries into the war. Israel is most 
likely to be the first, being especially favorable for Iran 
since its possible ally plans would significantly diminish 
regional Arab countries’ support to the United States in that 
operation. Hezbollah encouraged by Iran could launch a 
strike on Israel which would strike back at Lebanon. Kahl 
does not also eliminate possible Saudi Arabian and UAE 
involvement in the conflict as Riyadh’s confrontational 
posture against Iran is obvious. It is unlikely to tolerate 
Iranian attacks against critical energy infrastructure. For its 
part, the UAE the most hawkish state in the Gulf, might 
respond to missiles raining down on U.S. forces at its Al 
Dhafra Air Base by attempting to seize Abu Musa, Greater 
Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, three disputed Gulf islands cur-
rently occupied by Iran. (Kahl, Not Time to Attack, 2012). 
Another important threat arising from possible US 
strike against Iran is the reason through which religious ex-
tremists could wage an anti-American wave that according 
to Kahl would be used to transform the Arab Spring’s pop-
ulist anti-regime narrative into a decidedly anti-American 
one.  The United States would find it hard to justify its ac-
tions and persuade the regional population in the opposite 
as Iran would be the third Muslim country US launched a 
war against since the beginning of the 21st century, in a so 
small period of time. It would open doors to Iran to play a 
victim role to obtain more support as a fighter against US 
and the West in the region. 
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The opponents of striking Iran dismiss the idea that 
the US would not manage to stop Iran due to extremely 
large costs. They maintain that the US would not need to 
deploy many additional forces in the region since it already 
has a large presence encircling Iran and the existing U.S. 
presence in the region, perhaps supplemented by a limited 
forward deployment of nuclear weapons and additional 
ballistic missile defenses would be sufficient to deter a 
nuclear-armed Iran from aggression and blackmail. (Kahl, 
Not Time to Attack, 2012)
Another debatable issue looms from the threat of nu-
clear proliferation in case of Iran’s atomic armament. It 
has been suggested that if nuclear-armed, Iran could pro-
vide certain non-sovereign states and terrorist groups with 
nuclear weapons. Moreover, Iranian membership to the 
atomic club could raise nuclear arms race among regional 
powers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq and even Turkey. 
The first issue of nuclear proliferation by Iran is almost 
impossible due to two reasons: on the one hand, Iran would 
not act undetected and on the other hand, as noted by Waltz, 
countries can never entirely control or even predict the be-
havior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. (Waltz, 2012), 
making Iran faces two equally dangerous challenges. 
Regarding the threat of arms race in the Middle East 
from nuclear Iran, controversial questions spark as well. 
Waltz believes that If an atomic Israel, which was at war 
with many of its neighbors and posed a much bigger threat 
to Arab world, did not trigger an arms race then, there is no 
reason a nuclear Iran should now. (Waltz, 2012) Besides 
this, as Debs and Monteiro note, the fact that none of the 
countries, which are expected to get engaged in nuclear 
arms race, did not do so in response to Israel’s nucleariza-
tion, against which they could not count on U.S. backing, 
makes it less possible that they will change their behav-
ior in case of Iran’s nuclearization against which they can 
definitely count on US support. The authors believe that 
existing U.S. security guarantees, based on current capa-
bilities, give allies little incentive to nuclearize – “Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia are among the largest recipients of U.S. 
military support, and Turkey is a member of NATO. Rein-
forcing U.S. ties with friends in the region would be easier, 
cheaper, and less risky than attacking the Iranian nuclear 
program.” (Debs & Monteiro, 2012)
The truth is that the strike on Iran would not fully stop 
Iran but would just postpone for a while. Accordingly, the 
assault would not solve the problem, but only delay it, 
since Iran would be left with nuclear “know-how” and a 
stronger desire to get nuclear weapons as soon as possible 
to avoid possible future strikes. 
Debates: Shall a Nuclear Iran Bring More Peace or 
More Instability in the Region? 
Kenneth N. Waltz’ article “Why Iran Should Get the 
Bomb” has recently got on the public radar screen where 
Waltz claims that the Middle East will become a more 
peaceful place after Iran gets nuclearized. Furthermore, 
Waltz maintains that the only source of instability is nu-
clear Israel which through its unbalanced power poses a 
threat to the regional states: “It is Israel’s nuclear arsenal, 
not Iran’s desire for one, that has contributed most to the 
current crisis. … If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will 
deter each other, as nuclear powers always have.” (Waltz, 
2012). Waltz also believes that it is far more likely that if 
Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of pro-
viding for its own security, not to improve its offensive 
capabilities - or destroy itself. Waltz thinks that possible 
Iranian employment of it nuclear weapons against Israel 
or any US allies would invite massive retaliation and risk 
destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear. How-
ever, Iran’s leaders despite their inflammatory and hateful 
rhetoric, show no propensity for self-destruction. (Waltz, 
2012). 
Waltz’s article was soon responded by Colin H. Kahl’s 
article “Iran and the Bomb -Would a Nuclear Iran Make 
the Middle East More Secure?”. Kahl believes that Iran’s 
nuclearization would trigger off the kind of situation which 
known as “the stability-instability paradox,” in which the 
supposed stability created by mutually assured destruction 
generates greater instability by making provocations, dis-
putes, and conflict below the nuclear threshold seem safe. 
Thus, Kahl takes the idea that a nuclear-armed Iran, believ-
ing that it possessed a powerful deterrent and could thus 
commit violence abroad with near impunity, might increase 
the frequency and scale of aggression, engage in coercive 
diplomacy and blackmail its neighbors. (Kahl, 2012)
Kahl’s criticism was immediately reacted by Waltz in 
“Foreign Affairs” where he agrees with Kahl over the point 
that nuclear stability permits lower-level violence. Taking 
advantage of the protection that their atomic arsenals pro-
vide, nuclear-armed states can feel freer to make minor 
incursions, deploy terrorism, and engage in generally an-
noying behavior. But, Waltz notes, the question is how sig-
nificant these disruptive behaviors are compared with the 
peace and stability that nuclear weapons produce. Waltz 
believes that nuclear weapons prevent minor conflicts from 
becoming major wars. (Waltz, Waltz Replies, 2012)
Rational or Irrational? 
The question of rationality of the Iranian regime, as 
noted above, comes first in the discussions of nuclear-
armed Iranian threats. Those, who find Iranian authorities 
irrational, believe that it is almost impossible to foresee 
how they will react being nuclearized. It will be a huge 
threat equally against to the region, the West and particu-
larly the United States. That’s why those people predict nu-
clear deterrence and containment will not work. 
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The quite opposite is supposed by the individuals who 
see Iranian regime as rational and pragmatic. Most people, 
thinking likewise (e.g. Waltz, Mearsheimer, Zakaria) be-
lieve Iran’s every action taken on the international arena 
is driven by the instinct of self-survival and security. Their 
nuclear program also falls into this category enabling to 
predict Iran’s future actions and successful containment 
policy application by the West, because, despite the hys-
terical rhetoric by the Iranian authorities they seem to be 
less likely intent on self-destruction. Otherwise, it would 
be inevitable in case of possible realization of their threats. 
The final answer to the question of Iran’s rationality 
involves two sorts of rhetoric used domestically and in-
ternationally by the Iranian regime, often gone undivided 
by the western politicians. They should pay more attention 
to the messages sent to the international community rather 
than ones intended for domestic use. 
Focusing on domestic rhetoric prevents western politi-
cians from seeing pragmatism and realism Iran’s foreign 
policy is guided with. The entire Iranian foreign strategy is 
purely motivated by the issues of basic security and is often 
mistakenly named the source of religious fundamentalism 
and ideology by the West. Furthermore, some researchers 
have called Iran’s aggressive foreign policy kind of “offen-
sive defense” or defense through active military engage-
ment”. (Barzegar, 2010, pp.173-189).
There are pretty many examples of Iran’s pragmatic 
and rational foreign policy, among which so called Iran-
Contra scandal of Iran-Iraq war serves best. The scandal 
involved then-US administration, Israel and Iran.  The 
case was that during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had already 
exhausted the Shah-times military arsenal and was beset to 
obtain the needed amount of ammunition due to the sanc-
tions forbidding military trade with Iran. The Reagan ad-
ministration thought that if sold out some weapons secretly 
to Iran it would have a positive effect on the hostage crisis 
case and the administration would have enough financial 
resources to fund the Nicaraguan Contras, officially for-
bidden by Congress. The most interesting thing  in that 
case was the fact that Iran was supplied with US weapons 
through Israel called (Great Satan) by Iran. It proves that 
when vitally concerned, Iran can foreground pragmatic ac-
tions and set aside religious principles. 
Iran’s support of Christian Armenia in the Karabakh 
conflict rather than Shiite Azerbaijan bespeaks the victory 
of realism over religious principles. Iran is also pragmati-
cally motivated while assisting Hezbollah and Hamas: on 
the one hand Iran receives favor from the regional Mus-
lim populations promoting anti-Israeli forces. On the other 
hand Iran keeps its major enemy’s attention focused on 
another side making difficult for Israel being fully con-
centrated on Tehran. It’s noteworthy that despite hysterical 
rhetoric towards Israel, Iran has always sought to avoid a 
full-scale conflict with the Jewish state. 
Iran was pragmatically thinking while supporting Iraqi 
Shiite groups. Trying to intensify ties with Iraqi Shiite au-
thorities, Iran intended to make the possible future regional 
rival less dangerous. 
Iran’s reformist leaders’ attempts to rearrange rela-
tions with US are another example of pragmatism being 
misjudged by the latter in the past. Yet, Rafsanjani tried 
to restore economic ties with the United States. He de-
clared in his 1994 interview: “I have always been opposed 
to completely breaking our ties with the United States, 
they provide us with much needed spare parts and we sell 
them petrol. Therefore, our economic ties have ever been 
completely halted and some kind of dialogue must always 
exist. Although we pursue pragmatism in foreign policy, 
we will not be the first to initiate further dialogue with the 
Americans. Though, Iran’s initiative was soon followed by 
the Clinton administration’s new “comprehensive sanc-
tions” to “deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat 
to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the 
United States constituted by the actions and policies of the 
Government of Iran.” (Rieffer-Flanagan, 2009, pp.7-35) 
The United States had missed another chance to nor-
malize relations with Iran. Despite the Khatam’s coopera-
tion with US during the Afghan mission, George Bush in 
his 2002 State of the Union speech after 9/11 called Iran 
“axis of evil” together with North Korea and Iraq. The in-
considerate US action put Iran’s reformist president into an 
awkward position inside his country who had previously 
sought to remedy the ties with the United States, resulting 
the hardliners to strengthen in Tehran. 
While discussing rationality and pragmatism of the 
Iranian regime, it should be noted that their nuclear pro-
gram is also derived from the vital interests of the country. 
The declaration to develop a nuclear program is absolutely 
legitimate by Iran, since from the second half of the cen-
tury its oil resources will begin to diminish and the country 
will certainly need alternative means of energy and it is 
timely to think about it right now. The true purpose of the 
nuclear program is surely the security of Iranian regime 
that can be obtained by finally getting an atomic bomb. The 
environment Iran has to live in does urge it to think about 
security measures. Iran as a non-Arab Shiite country faces 
many challenges in the region where the majority is com-
posed of hostile Sunnite Arabic nations. Iran is surrounded 
by nuclear-armed countries including Israel, Russia, Chi-
na, India and Pakistan, not to mention some US military 
units stationed near the Iranian border. The region has been 
in a constant state of instability for last few decades, some-
times grown into full-scale regional wars or small conflicts 
during the Cold War. The United States with a clear wish of 
change in the Iranian leadership, has launched two wars in 
regional Muslim countries in the last decade that resulted 
in replacing the existing governments and remaining US 
troops there for a certain time also sending a warning sig-
33
Strike or not to Strike, Options on the Table to Stop Iran from Going Nuclear
Journal of Social Sciences, 1(2):29-34,2012 ISSN:2233-3878
nal to Iran. It is interesting to note that the United States 
has never invaded nuclearized North Korea frequently 
named a part of “axis of evil”, leading us believe the Iran’s 
nuclear program serves to meet vital security needs of both 
its sovereignty and government. 
Iran’s aggressive foreign policy can simply be said to 
bear an absolutely defensive nature and is quite rational 
and pragmatic seeking to provide it with vital security 
guarantees. This fact casts a shadow over the arguments 
that it is impossible to predict Iran’s future actions and con-
tain it and on the contrary, consolidates the opposite claims 
that nuclear Iran will not take a step in the future to cause a 
strike against it leading to its complete destruction. 
Options on the Table
The United States has four possible courses of action 
against Iran’s nuclear program: strike, sanctions and other 
non-military means, diplomatic engagement, and contain-
ment. At the beginning of the article there were some ideas 
about negative results of strike involving full-scale and 
lengthy war with no clear exit strategy. The war would help 
Iran play a role of victim and gain a considerable amount 
of support from the regional populations as a front-line 
fighter against the “Great Satan”. The ultimate negative 
side of the strike would be its inability not to fully stop the 
nuclear program but postpone it for certain time. Even in 
the case of complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear arsenal, 
the “know-how” will be remaining in the country only in-
creasing the desire to rebuild an atomic bomb to avoid any 
future risks of hitting. 
Regarding the sanctions applied against Iran by the 
west, they are doomed to failure for several reasons: first, 
Russia, China and some other non-Western countries re-
veal their readiness to continue cooperation with Iran even 
under sanctions. The same can be said about Iranian mar-
ket, if it goes unoccupied by the West, the job will be done 
by the East relieving the loss by Iran. Second, the sanc-
tions would have negative influence not only on the regime 
but on the Iranian people whose anger would be directed 
against the West and the United Sates casting the regime as 
a victim and the US as an enemy. Third, the Iranian gov-
ernment would always find some so called “black holes” 
through which illegal revenue could be received directly 
not by the country self but by the regime. In the end, pres-
sure with sanctions would make Iran more committed to 
get a nuclear weapon soon to intensify bargaining power 
in any negotiations to avoid any future chance of being a 
victim of outside pressure. 
As for the diplomatic engagement, US and Iran had a 
good chance to do so from the second half of 1990s to 2002 
when Iran’s reformist presidents publicly declared their 
wish of restoring ties with the US preceded by possible 
economic relations restoration. Assisting the US in the war 
in Afghanistan against Taliban in 2001 can be considered 
another important step in correcting the relations. Unfor-
tunately, the US failed to adequately assess the situation 
during both Clinton and Bush administrations resulting in 
loss of trust by the Iranian people to reformist president 
Khatam’s foreign policy leading to electing more anti-
Western Mahmud Ahmadinejad. 
Diplomatic engagement got another chance when 
Barack Obama was elected and directed US foreign policy 
towards correcting American image in the Muslim world 
from the very beginning of his presidency. His famous 
speech in Cairo contained a very clear message of re-en-
gagement. His video address to the Iranian people for Per-
sian New Year served this purpose as well. The change in 
US rhetoric had no any tangible moves in interaction with 
Iran that did not gone unnoticed by the Iranian political 
elite. 
Obama’s Middle East policy was adequately seen by 
Iran as an attempt to isolate and to curb their influence in 
the region. Obama who radically changed his predeces-
sor’s foreign doctrine in an attempt to restore the US image 
in the world almost left the Bush policy towards Iran intact 
responded by Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khame-
nei for Obama’s New Year address as a change in Iranian 
attitudes would be contingent on ‘‘genuine’’ and ‘‘real’’ 
changes in the U.S. position vis-à-vis Iran. (Barzegar, 
2010, pp.173-189)
If the United States is really focused on improving re-
lations with Iran and plans to convince Iran in abandoning 
the nuclear program based on restored mutual trust, it must 
realize that more Iran is cornered more aggressive policy 
it may apply in the region in terms of assisting certain ter-
rorist groups and other regional spoilers. After the United 
States awakens to the realization that the region cannot 
be secured at the expense of Iran and allows the latter to 
integrate into the regional political-security architecture, 
more constructive relations may arise. Otherwise, while 
the West naively discusses possible regime change in Iran 
or the ways of grabbing advantage of Iran’s domestic po-
litical movements, self-survival instinct will force the Ira-
nian leaders to oppose US and its allies’ regional interests, 
keep aggressive and hysteric rhetoric against Israel  and 
back the terrorist groups fighting against it enabling Iran to 
cast itself as a Muslim opposition leader gaining significant 
support from the regional Islamic nations. 
Today we can say that a bridge of trust between Iran 
and US is destroyed and the Obama administration has 
failed to reconstruct it so far, minimizing the chances for 
the United States to convince Iran in abandoning the nu-
clear program through diplomatic engagement or offering 
some grand bargain. Thus, the situation pushes the US to 
think about a containment policy and ways of its possible 
implementation since it might be the only alternative to the 
Iranian nuclear program. 
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It should be noted that the United States has enough 
troops in the region for engaging into a containment policy 
with no need to increase them in number. The US would 
have to deploy additional nuclear weapons and antimissile 
systems. Also, the US would have to extend its security 
umbrella over regional allies. Apart from being responsible 
for allies’ security to keep them in its orbit, the US should 
never fail to provide them with adequate security guaran-
tees to avoid see them on the path to building nuclear arms 
of their own. It would be a total collapse of the nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty having a very negative bearing on 
the global security. 
It is interesting to note that as some researchers feel 
the US containment policy if put in practice, may serve as 
a demotivating factor for Iran’s nuclear program after real-
izing the consequential growth of US military presence in 
the region and rising support among Arabic nations to the 
United States resulting in diminishing Iran’s positions and 
security in the region. 
Conclusion 
In the end we can conclude that Iran’s aggressive for-
eign policy bears defensive nature driven by the self-sur-
vival instinct of an isolated country. The nuclear program 
also serves this very purpose to provide more security 
guarantees for the regime and minimize the risk of external 
strike. Iran tries to force the West to get to the negotiating 
table and intensify its bargaining power during the talks to 
be more respected by both regional and international re-
publics. 
The regional spoiler role is the only one to be played 
by Iran today, enabling this developing and unformed 
economy country to resemble a great power player. Thus, 
if the United States does wish to neutralize nuclear-armed 
Iran and consequential threats, it should stop to isolate the 
latter from regional politics since cornered Iran is more ag-
gressive, proved by many factors. 
The only option on the table for the US is diplomatic 
engagement with Iran if strikes on nuclear facilities and 
pressure with sanctions both fail. This option could be put 
in practice after the United States stops isolating Iran from 
regional politics and let this country become one of the 
building blocks of regional political security architecture. 
Correspondingly, the nuclear program would likely be re-
moved from the list of Iran’s top priorities unlike the cur-
rent situation. 
Unfortunately, it should be noted that the United States 
under Obama administration has failed to restore the lost 
mutual trust between the two countries so far. Moreover, 
as previously stated, despite the US incumbent president 
has successfully managed to correct the US image through-
out the world and improved relations with leading nations, 
he has left his predecessor’s policies with Iran almost in-
tact except that rhetoric. Hoping that US will ultimately 
achieve Iran’s abandonment of its nuclear program through 
diplomatic engagement seems less realistic due to above 
mentioned US course of actions, making the latter think 
about a containment policy of nuclear Iran concurrently. 
Still, the situation does not rule out slight chances for US 
to avoid face nuclear Iran through diplomacy. Hopefully, 
during his second term in office, Obama free from any ree-
lection campaigning, will find it in himself to handle op-
ponents’ accusations of his weakness and launch a more 
effective policy towards Iran in terms of diplomatic en-
gagement.
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